Nós na Fundação Dom Cabral temos uma verdadeira obsessão pelo perfeccionismo e ficamos profundamente chateados quando as coisas não acontecem como planejamos. Isso é bom por um lado - a busca pela excelência - e ruim por outro, uma vez que "sometimes, shit happens": as oportunidades de reflexão e aprendizado são os caminhos a serem trilhados.
Para ilustrar, relato um acontecido do primeiro dia do programa de Harvard aqui na China. Após as boas vindas e abertura do programa, o Chairman do Programa - Paul Marshall - descobriu (e eu fui meio que o "dedo-duro") que nenhum dos materiais havia sido postado no website do programa na plataforma de Harvard (e olha que eu enviei dois emails - ainda no Brasil - para o coordenador do programa, alertando-o sobre o fato). Assim sendo, não havia como trabalhar no turno do manhã. Além disso, parte do material impresso também não havia chegado e a sala de aula não estava totalmente funcional no belíssimo e bem equipado Harvard Center aqui em Shanghai:
 |
| com Paul Marshall, HBS, na coquetel de recepção e jantar - Pudong - Shangri-la |
Após uma primeira sessão de 1:20 que foi uma perda de tempo total e absoluta (eu me entreti com o jogo de cintura e a capacidade de improvisação do Marshall), a turma toda que toca o programa se reuniu em uma sala anexa (portas fechadas!) para acertar os ponteiros. Parafraseando meu amigo Ian McGovern, professor em Cingapura, "voaram penas para todos os lados". É óbvio que o programa e a performance de todos foi prejudicada na manhã, mas...
 |
| com Ian McGovern, Cingapura |
É bom lembrar que o seminário é sobre case writing: a lógica é compreender o framework que governa a elaboração de casos da Harvard Business School. Já adianto que os casos de Harvard possuem uma lógica bem diferente dos casos que escrevemos para nossos programas de mestrado e/ou doutorado. Nossos casos, em sua maioria, tendem a ser casos de pesquisas, em sua maioria descritivas, ao passo que os de Harvard são "protagonist-based". Há casos de Harvard que vem acompanhados de "teaching notes", auxílio interessante para outros professores do mundo inteiro interessados em utilizar casos de Harvard em suas disciplinas. A estrutura dos TN's (teaching notes) é simples e inteligente:
- Case Synopsis
- Case Teaching Objectives
- Opportunities for student analysis (quantitative/qualitative)
- Teaching Sequence (pouca gente sacou isso: a sequência segue o "estilo do professor" ou o contexto por ele enfrentado - action-analysis ou analysis-action)
- Additional Topics
- Wrap-ups (chamamos no Brasil de "amarração)
- Unanswered and thought-provoking questions
- Exhibits (alguns inexistem na versão dos alunos, só o professor tem acesso)
Eu sempre me perguntei o que torna um caso interessante e joguei a provocação aqui na minha apresentação. As respostas foram meio óbvias: boa história/estória, 10 páginas, múltiplas questões/conteúdo, ambiguidade, pushbacks, not the "obvious answers", etc.. ou a pergunta é pouco relevante, ou precisamos nos aprofundar mais no debate... Marshall me respondeu com outra pergunta: "ao utilizar casos, o que vc está tentando desenvolver? Conteúdo? Habilidades (commitment to act, how to get things done)? Ou atitudes? Bem interesante...
Nas sessões seguintes, Noam Wasserman (bastante envolvido com as questões metodológicas em Harvard) me questionou sobre a forma de escrever casos da FDC. Não me senti à vontade para falar da FDC (até mesmo pq não sei como os colegas escrevem seus casos), mas apresentei o meu framework (muito bem aceito pelos colegas, com muitas cabeças acenando em sinal de positivo):
- Goals/Objectives
- Problem Framing/Questions
- Analysis
- Trade-offs/ Decision Making
- Lenght of the case/ ammount of preparation
O objetivo de Wasserman era conectar plano de aula, case writing e teaching notes, retomando a perspectiva que relatei em post anteriores deste blog: "pastures & takeaways". Wasserman questiona a forma como os professores mais antigos de Harvard escrevem seus casos e propõe uma nova fórmula, totalmente ligada à pesquisa. Para isso, os tediosos casos da Virtualis e Ockham (vejam post anterior) serviram de ilustração. Wasserman deixou um "homework" para ser entregue até a meia noite.
Eu me senti bem a vontade no programa, até porque levei a preparação aí no Brasil ao extremo. Outro facilitador foi o fato de ter escrito um caso para a disciplina de inovação em uma turma do MBA em Consórcio da FDC (vejam posts anteriores), com uma lógica bastante parecida e já apurada após minha participação no GCPCL de julho/2010.
O desafio de ontem e hoje era preparar entre 6 e 8 takeaways para um caso que Wasserman escreveu. Dispunhamos de uma versão reduzida do caso Ockham e de extratos da entrevista com o fundador da empresa. Fui líder da minha sessão, grupo 2, composta majoritariamente por chineses. As barreiras à comunicação e diferenças culturais surgiram. Após 20 minutos de discussão, percebi que a maioria não havia preparado nada e meio que me pediram para fazer sozinho e enviar para a coordenação do programa. Além dos takeaways, Wasserman insistia em um "bullet list outline" para os dilemas de funding da empresa. Trabalhei até as 23:45 e enviei o draft abaixo:
GCPCL – CWCD Seminar – Shanghai, China, 2011
Group 2
POTENTIAL TAKEAWAYS
1. Entrepreneurial behavior (concepts, trade-offs)
2. VC x Angels (definitions, trade-offs, short and long term consequences, decision making)
3. Equity Splitting: Founding/start up with Friends (potential problems)
4. Outsource x Inhouse – context-based decision?
5. Board assembly –
BULLET-LIST OUTLINE FOR THE “VC-versus-Angel” SECTION
· VC, Private Investors, Angels
· Due Diligence/Valuation
· Dealing with different offers (bounded rationality, decision making)
· Cutting a deal/Negotiation (anti-dilution provision and other contract issues)
· “Selling without a product”- (cash flow needs, long term funding)
· Avoiding pitfalls – The assembly of the board (avoiding unilateral actions)
No início da sessão de hoje, Wasserman comentou acerca dos resultados. Gostei do framework dele: um
potencial takeaway (aquilo que vc quer que seus alunos levem pra casa como aprendizado) é uma matriz 2x2,
cujas variáveis são "obvious - non obvious" x "not important - important".
O seu takeaway é igual a non-obvious + important. Bingo! Cravamos dois na lista acima (equity splitting e outsource x in house context-based decision)
Por fim, terminamos o dia com a dolorosa missão de escrever partes de um caso de Harvard e acabou sobrando para mim. Acabo de receber os resultados e Bingo! novamente! :)
HBS – CWCD Seminar – Shanghai, China – Wasserman’s Assignmet – Jan, 19th, 2010
Group 2
CASE INTRODUCTION
Jim Triandiflou was facing many difficult - yet conflicting - decisions running his business and was anxious to figure out more clearly all of the trade-offs and possible outcomes. Even though he was aware of his bounded-rationality when it came to decision making, it was time to face the fact that major issues had to be solved and serious decisions had to be made. He never thought too much of himself as an entrepreneur, but now suddenly found himself as one, dealing with the fact that his co-founders and management team were having a hard time trying to figure out whether to keep their old jobs (and salaries), or quitting and working full time in their new enterprise, and even putting some money and splitting equity among them. Finding a founding team is never an easy task. Should we all work full time? Should we have the same equity? How much of our own money should we put in our new venture? What are the competencies we need to be successful?
After discussing and writing their business plan and financial propositions, they finally had their start-up that was aimed to fill in a hole in the software industry. They decided to develop a software to sit right in between Siebel (the sale reps side and CRM) and SAP (finance). It looks like their idea of SMA (Sales Force Automation) was a promising one and they named their company Ockham. Triandiflou and associates gave themselves six months to sell something, but most of their efforts showed no results. Along the way, something happened on the way to heaven: IBM bought their idea, as IBM was flying blind on measuring the performance of their sales force. After having a hard time with their prototypes and only partially solving the problems, they closed the deal and went out selling products that they didn’t have.
Triandiflou had to speed things up, but wasn’t sure about the hiring of his developing and operational staff:
“Outsource or in-house? Is that some sort of context-based decision? What are the trade-offs?”
Finally, two interdependent issues needed an answer: strategy and funding. Triandiflou knew that the strategy would determine the funding, but the funding would shape the strategy. Venture capitalists were said to be vultures, while “Angles” might not have the amount of money they needed before becoming profitable. Cash flow and profits: tough decisions, tough times and “time will tell”.
VC versus ANGEL SECTION
When it came to work on the funding for Ockham Technologies, Triandiflou was more confident:
“oh, we were flying high. Because the IBM deal, there was $50.000 upfront, 90.000 for the next piece, and then it was a $500.000 piece after that, which turned into a million. We didn’t even had a product, for gosh sakes.”
After having moved the company to the ATCD – Atlantic Technology Development Center - Triandiflou’s and Ockham’s credibility were climbing high. Therefore, a few different funding possibilities were opening for them. Should they go with private investors, venture capitalist or “Angels”? Is there a best option available? What trade-offs was Ockham facing?
One private investor from Texas was willing to bid some money into the business, tough his main business was as an independent real state developer. According to Triandiflou, the “Texas Guys” put a reasonable term sheet”
“[…] and their term sheet was extremely interesting. […] they would give us, I think, $2 or $3 million. They would fund us up to $10 million. They were taking 50% of the company on day one, and they would keep their hands out of the business.”
Venture capitalists also showed real interest in Ockham Technologies. Monark Partners, who entitled themselves as “a next generation venture capital firm”, offered Triandiflou a different term sheet:
“[…]they were going to take (sic) 30-40% of the company. […] and they were going to give us $2 million, value us at – yeah, they were going to value us at $4, give us $2, they’d take 1/3.”
Triandiflou’s decision laid on valuation and to get to the partners’ term sheet there was really none. But, what if, Ockham was under-valuated? What was the real potential of their business? Cordova Ventures and Noro-Mosley Partners also showed interest in the funding process. Would “Angels” be a feasible option? Could it be carried through short-term and long-term needs?
At the same time of the funding decisions, a board would have to be set up. How could Triandiflou prevent board members from acting unilaterally? Should he go with the Texas Guy? Or the VCs? Or the Angles? Or all of them? Would they all fit together?
Para terminar, mais algumas fotos:
Até a próxima! Riva
